April 16th / 17th 1967
Preface
The 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division moved into
Long An Province during February and March 1967. Long An is bounded on
the north by Saigon, on the west by the Plain of Reeds, on the east by
the Saigon River, and on the south by Dinh Tuong and Go Cong
Provinces. The most populated province in the Republic of Vietnam, it
is the commerce center of the rice-rich Mekong River belt, the portal
to Saigon from the south and the location of a series of enemy
communication lines to the lower Delta and the capitol, Saigon.
The 3d Brigade was assigned the mission of
conducting a consolidation operation throughout Long An Province with
emphasis on Rach Kien, Tan Tru, Binh Phuoc Districts, the area around
Tan An, the province capital, and to open Highway 4, the main route of
commerce between Saigon and the Delta. Code named "Enterprise," the
operation was aimed at defeating organized enemy forces, eliminating
enemy infrastructure and conducting pacification operations. The enemy
traditionally had a strong hold on Long An and moved his guerrilla
bands, local and regional force companies, and main force battalions
through the area with impunity.
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The 3d Battalion, 39th Infantry had been conducting
operations in Rach Kien District for a short time prior to the 3d
Brigade move and had established a fire support/patrol base (FS/PB) in
the village of Rach Kien. In early March, the 2d Battalion, 60th
Infantry was moved to Ben Luc, on Highway 4, to temporarily operate in
that area until its scheduled move to Tan Tru District, some 14
kilometers to the south, at a later date. During the second week in
March, the brigade headquarters moved to the outskirts of Tan An to
establish their base near the province capital and the airstrip. On
March 15, 1967, the 5th Battalion (Mechanized), 60th Infantry
displaced from the 9th Infantry Division forward operational base at
Dong Tam to the district of Binh Phuoc which, although the battalion
operated throughout the northern Delta, became their primary area of
operations.
The 5th Battalion (Mech) was organized as follows:
Headquarters and Headquarters Company
Reconnaissance Platoon (Mech)
Heavy ( 4.2-inch) Mortar Platoon (Mech)
Antitank (106mm RR) Platoon
Ground Surveillance Platoon
Communication Platoon (Mech)
Medical Platoon (Mech)
A Company, 5/60 (Mech) Infantry
B Company, 5/60 (Mech) Infantry
C Company, 3/60 Infantry (attached)
B Battery, 2/4 Artillery (direct support)
3d Platoon, C/15 Engineers ( direct support )
During the first weeks in Binh Phuoc, the 5th
Battalion's operations resulted in many small contacts and two
company-size battles. During this period the battalion placed special
emphasis on night operations utilizing squad to platoon-size patrols.
This brief period soon proved to have been sound training. By
mid-April, the battalion's experiences had hardened the troops and
tested the commanders, and the morale was high due to several
successes the unit had experienced during this period.
On Apri1 16, 1967, the 5th Battalion was conducting
limited operations in the vicinity of Binh Phuoc. The attached Company
C, 3d Battalion was operating southeast of Binh Phuoc village. At 1230
hours the
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brigade operations officer reported that the 3d
Battalion, 39th Infantry had made sharp contact with an estimated
enemy battalion in their area of operation near Cau Long Son. He
ordered the 5th Battalion to alert one company for airmobile
redeployment to reinforce the 3d Battalion. After a quick review of
his dispositions, 5th Battalion's CO determined that his Company C,
currently committed to a non-critical sweep and reasonably
consolidated for pick-up, would be alerted. In addition, since the
move was by helicopter, it was more reasonable to commit a straight
Infantry company.
A short time later, the brigade command group
arrived at the 5th Battalion's CP (Binh Phuoc) with instructions to
make the move as soon as the helicopters arrived. Company C, now ready
on a PZ, was ordered to conduct an airmobile assault. Their mission
was to sweep south through the wood line below the LZ in an effort to
make contact with any enemy elements attempting to withdraw to the
northwest, and then establish a blocking position in the vicinity of
the junction Doi Ma Creek and route 227. The brigade command group
coordinated a short artillery preparation of the landing zone and gun
ships escorted the troop carrying helicopters into the LZ.
After making an unopposed landing, Company C moved
south as planned. Minutes later the lead elements made contact with an
enemy squad attempting to escape the 3d Battalion's encirclement.
Employing rapid fire and movement, the company eliminated the enemy
without sustaining any casualties. The company then continued to move
south without further contact and reached their blocking position
shortly after 1700 hours.
Meanwhile, the 3d Battalion (minus) was still
engaged in a violent battle against a frantic enemy who was using all
means to break contact, but by 2200 hours the action subsided to only
sporadic contacts. The battalion remained in position throughout the
night in order to sweep the battle area at sunrise. The remainder of
the night was characterized by frequent enemy probes against the
friendly positions in what apparently was either an attempt to find a
gap in the encirclement or a feint to cover enemy egress in another
area.
At approximately 1700 hours the same day, the 5th
Battalion was alerted to move to the village of Rach Kien, with one
additional rifle company, for prepositioning and quicker reaction for
influencing the battle in progress. Company A was left to secure the
battalion's fire
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support base and the Reconnaissance Platoon was to conduct patrol
operations around Binh Phuoc. Battery B, 2/4 Artillery (DS) was moved
to Ben Luc, to reinforce the artillery fires already within range of
the battle. The battalion (minus) departed their base and closed at
Rach Kien at approximately 1900 hours. Upon arrival, Company B coiled
in the village while the command group coordinated with the commander
and staff of 3d Battalion. During this situation briefing, the CO, 5th
Battalion was notified to remain in the village and not to proceed
into the battle area until ordered. However, the 5th's CO thought that
an immediate move into the area of contact would greatly assist the 3d
Battalion in containing and destroying the enemy, as well as achieving
better positioning for subsequent operations. The request for
immediate employment was denied because of a known enemy minefield in
route to the battle area, the only area through which APCs could move
to enter western Rach Kien District. The minefield, plus darkness,
would make the move extremely hazardous. Weighing the risk involved
against the benefits, 5th Battalion's commander made a second request
to deploy into the battle area.
It was now 2100 hours. The 5th Battalion (minus) set out after
carefully planning its route through the mined area. The force of one
rifle company mounted in 18 Ml13s and the command group mounted in two
Ml13s and one MS77 set out in single file formation under strict light
discipline. By 2200 hours the unit had moved through the minefield
without incident. (It is interesting to note that at a later date this
battalion sustained APC losses when moving through the same mined area
during daylight).
While in route, the battalion commander received instructions to
link up with the 3d Battalion and resume control of Company C, 3d
Battalion, 60th Infantry. Upon link up, the battalion's mission was to
block to the south, patrol aggressively to preclude enemy egress to
the north and prepare to conduct a sweep the following morning. After
arrival and link-up, the battalion deployed as ordered and began
planning for the next day's operation.
On the morning of April 17th, the battalion set out to sweep the
area west of the previous day's contact. The plan called for Company
B, with APCs, to conduct a sweep west-southwest through the wood line
and streams near Ap Xom Cau. Simultaneously, Company C minus one
platoon was to sweep southwest and turn their sweep northwest
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upon reaching the southeastern end of Ap Ben Do at
route 228. The remaining platoon from Company C was to conduct an
airmobile assault into an LZ just northeast of Ap Ray at the same time
as Company B's arrival at its start point. The platoon's mission was
to conduct a search of the vegetated area north of the Rach Ong Binb
and along the Rach Sau. H-hour was set for 0705 hours.
At 0700 hours the helicopters arrived to pick up
the first platoon of Company C. They touched down in the LZ at H-hour
without benefit of an artillery preparation. Moments later, as the
platoon reorganized for their search, they came under heavy fire. The
enemy, located along the Rach Sau, had obviously been surprised. The
platoon leader, experienced and in complete control of his unit,
employed fire and maneuver and attacked into the wood line. Gun ships
arrived within minutes to support the platoon. Moving directly into
the Rach Sau, the platoon swept both banks and the stream bed itself.
In the stream they engaged a frantic squad size enemy force. The enemy
was using reeds to breathe below the water's surface while attempting
to disengage to the southeast. Within minutes enemy bodies bobbed to
the surface of the now red water. The platoon continued southeast in a
meticulous search of the wood line and the stream.
Meanwhile, Company B arrived at its start point at
H-hour. The company commander's plan was to drop-off the 1st platoon
at the start point and have them sweep west along the creek while the
2d platoon was to sweep south along the creek in that area. The 3d
platoon and company headquarters was to move to Ap Chua Ba Khai,
search that area and then sweep south. The APCs, with drivers and
track commanders, were to be used to screen and block along the outer
edges of the wood lines. Upon arriving at the start point the 1st
platoon dismounted from their APCs and proceeded west into the woods.
As they entered the woods, the platoon leader was shot and later died
in route to a hospital. The platoon, now under command of the platoon
sergeant, attacked the enemy position and destroyed it. After a quick
reorganization, the platoon continued west. For this unit, the
remainder of the day was typified by brief engagements with small
enemy elements. Each time they eliminated the resistance from what
appeared to be a series of enemy pickets conducting a delay-type
action. By mid after noon they had reached the stream junction and
linked up with the 2d platoon.
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The 2d platoon searched the wood line and stream
throughout the day, with small sporadic contacts. As it was later
discovered, their presence in this area forced the enemy into killing
zones for the remainder of the company.
Upon reaching Ap Chua Ba Khai, and following
notification of the 1st platoon's initial contact, the Company B
commander turned the APCs of the 3d platoon and Company Headquarters
south and headed into the gap between the platoon of Company C
operating along the Rach Sau and his 2d platoon in the wood line to
the east. As this force headed south, they observed a large cluster of
small haystacks. As they closed with them the haystacks began to move.
Each stack was an enemy soldier trying to conceal his attempt to break
out from the impending encirclement. In the words of the company
commander, "It was a hay day." Employing the .50 caliber and M60
machineguns mounted on the APCs, the company (minus) conducted a
mounted attack directly into the fleeing enemy. Across the open field
and paddy dikes they pursued the enemy. After insuring the destruction
of that enemy force and thoroughly searching the area of contact, the
3d platoon and company headquarters moved back to Ap Chua Ba Khai and
swept that area with no results.
At H-hour of this same day, Charlie Company, minus
one platoon, moved out in a sweep of its assigned area. Moving west,
the company searched the area along the Rach Ong Ung and by 1000 hours
reached route 228 without incident. But, based on the assessment that
the battalion's current contact north of the Rach Ong Binh was an
enemy unit of company-size, it was determined that C Company should
continue its sweep into Ap Ben Do with one platoon moving southwest
while the remainder of the company continued south along route 228.
The company commander chose to place himself between and to the rear
of his two platoons. Making a very deliberate and careful approach,
the company began its sweep.
Concurrent with the evolution of events in the
Bravo Company sector and following consultation with the 5th Battalion
and 3/39 Infantry COs, which was no longer in contact, the brigade
commander placed all available artillery and gun ships in direct
support of the 5th Battalion, requested an air alert of fighter-bomber
sorties in close air support of the 5th and moved the 2nd Battalion,
minus one company, into a blocking position southwest of the Yam Co
Dong River. The 2d Battalion
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was to be reinforced and assisted by Vietnamese
river assault craft. This blocking force was in position by
approximately 1130 hours and by 1400 the 3d Battalion had concluded
its sweep along Doi Ma Creek and was extracted to its base at Rach
Kien, leaving a small stay-behind force to survey the former battle
area.
Around 1100 hours, Company C, now moving southwest
towards Ap Ben Do, began receiving heavy fire from the wood line to
its front. The enemy was deployed on line in bunkered positions along
the north- eastern edge of the wood line. During the initial volley of
fire, Charlie Company sustained two casualties and moments later a
company medic was killed attempting to reach the wounded. Due to the
open terrain and excellent fields of fire afforded the enemy in Ap Ben
Do, Charlie Company was unable to maneuver effectively, despite
several desperate tries on the part of the company commander. A
medical evacuation helicopter attempting to get to the wounded was
shot down, adding two additional casualties. The battalion command
group landed at Charlie Company to make an on-the-spot assessment. By
this time Company C's artillery forward observer, demonstrating great
courage, had moved forward and was directing the fire of two batteries
of 105mm artillery on the enemy positions approximately 300 meters to
his front. The artillery, firing a linear concentration to cover the
target, was only marginally successful in neutralizing the enemy.
Gun ships were then employed, again with limited
success. Two air strikes came on station and met with greater success
in silencing the enemy. The battalion requested six more air strikes
to attack in succession and divided the linear target in half,
directing the aircraft on the southern half while the battalion
artillery liaison officer massed all available artillery on the
northern half of the target. In this way the artillery was able to
concentrate its fires in a smaller area and be more effective. With
careful coordination between the artillery, the forward air controller
and the fighter pilots, this system proved successful and fire
superiority was achieved. At this time a second dust-off was called in
and the wounded were evacuated.
Assessing the enemy's firepower and frontage to be
that of a dug-in battalion, the 5th Battalion's CO decided to rely on
artillery and air support to gain the upper hand and then maneuver
against the enemy position. Since the remainder of his battalion was
committed to operations in Binh Phuoc, he requested an additional
rifle company to assault
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the wood line. The request was approved and Company
B, 3d Battalion went under the operational control of the 5th
Battalion. Realizing the unprotected posture of Company C, the
battalion commander ordered B/5 to release four APCs from the 1st
platoon. These APCs moved immediately to Company C's position and,
upon arrival, came under the control of Charlie Company.
The APCs arrived at approximately 1200 hours and
elements of Company C, under the control of a platoon leader, mounted
the vehicles. Still under fire, this ad hoc mechanized unit assaulted
the northern end of the enemy position. With all machineguns firing
they closed to within 100 meters of the enemy and destroyed several
positions. By now, Charlie Company had managed to move its right flank
closer to the contact while the left flank remained in its original
position, placing small arms fire on the objective. Charlie Company
was now running low on ammunition and a re-supply was flown in by
helicopter. One of the APCs was disengaged and used to distribute the
ammunition along the company line and the few casualties sustained so
far were evacuated to a safe PZ for pick-up by dust-off.
By 1400 hours Company B, 3d Battalion was airborne
and in route to join the battle. Upon landing they would attack
northwest into the wood line. By doing this, the battalion would hit
the enemy on a flank and from a different direction. Following a
short, violent artillery LZ preparation, Bravo Company, 3d Battalion
landed and pushed toward the objective with a two-platoon front. The
company walked artillery about 100 meters forward of their point while
Charlie Company ceased all small arms fire. Plagued by a maze of booby
traps and sustaining casualties, the assaulting company was making
very slow progress.
Anxious to complete the sweep before dark and
having neutralized the enemy, the battalion CO decided to give Company
B, 3d Battalion a limit of advance and move Company C into the
northern part of the objective. This attack was executed with minor
resistance and by 1700 hours the entire objective had been swept. In
Ap Ben Do alone, 73 enemy KIA were found. This fact, coupled with the
equal successes of Company B, 5th Battalion and the 1st platoon of
Company C to the north of Rach Ong Binh, indicated that a large
portion of an enemy battalion had been destroyed. The 5th Battalion,
60th Infantry suffered 11 casualties and consolidated for the night,
leaving stay-behind forces in Ap Ben Do and Ap Chua Ba Khai. The night
passed without incident. The enemy had been defeated.
